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Abstract
We model the coevolution of behavioral strategies and social learning rules in the context of a cooperative dilemma, a situation in which
individuals must decide whether or not to subordinate their own interests to those of the group. There are two learning rules in our model,
conformism and payoff-dependent imitation, which evolve by natural selection, and three behavioral strategies, cooperate, defect, and
cooperate, plus punish defectors, which evolve under the influence of the prevailing learning rules. Group and individual level selective
pressures drive evolution.
We also simulate our model for conditions that approximate those in which early hominids lived. We find that conformism can evolve
when the only problem that individuals face is a cooperative dilemma, in which prosocial behavior is always costly to the individual.
Furthermore, the presence of conformists dramatically increases the group size for which cooperation can be sustained. The results of our
model are robust: they hold even when migration rates are high, and when conflict among groups is infrequent.
D 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
We are a cooperative species. Experimental evidence and
field data show that humans often sacrifice resources in
order to benefit nonrelatives, even when those who benefit
are not expected to return the favor (Gintis, Bowles, Boyd,
& Fehr, 2003). People sometimes use baltruistic punish-
mentQ to enforce cooperation, whereby they pay a cost in
order to punish noncooperators whom they will never meet
again (Fehr & Gaechter, 2000, 2002; Ostrom, Walker, &
Gardner, 1992). The combination of unrequited cooperation
between nonrelatives and altruistic punishment is known as
bstrong reciprocityQ (Gintis, 2000). Both of these compo-
nents of strong reciprocity pose a puzzle for the standard
evolutionary theories of cooperation: kin selection (Hamil-
ton, 1964) and reciprocal altruism (Axelrod & Hamilton,
1981; Trivers, 1971).
Some authors argue that human cooperation may be
explained by the selection of cultural traits at the group level
(Bowles, Choi, & Hopfensitz, 2003; Boyd & Richerson,
1985; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Sober & Wilson,
1994). Assuming that cooperative groups out-compete less
cooperative ones in the struggle for survival, then it may be
possible for group level selective pressure to outweigh the
maladaptive nature of altruism at the individual level. For
this to occur, either noncooperative individuals must invade
cooperative groups infrequently or else the amount of
intergroup conflict must be very high.
Analytical models suggest that two factors play a crucial
role in the emergence of cooperation: altruistic punishment
and conformism (i.e., the tendency of individuals to imitate
the most common form of behavior; see Boyd & Richerson,
1985, and Henrich & Boyd, 1998). Gintis (2000) proves
that, when a group faces the threat of extinction, a small
number of altruistic punishers may induce selfish individ-
uals to behave cooperatively. Henrich and Boyd (2001)
show that the presence of conformists may permit altruistic
punishment to persist and thereby facilitate the emergence
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and survival of cooperation. Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, and
Richerson (2003) report simulations that mimic the envi-
ronment in which early hominids lived. They show that
altruistic punishment enhances cooperative behavior when
social learning takes the form of payoff-dependent imitation
(i.e., when individuals imitate the most successful forms of
behavior). However, this mixture of group selection and
punishment cannot sustain cooperation in large groups if the
migration rate between groups is high and conflict between
groups is low.
Boyd and Richerson (2005) argue that cultural group
selection is especially strong in human populations due to
the fact that variation among human groups is maintained by
an unusual combination of strong reciprocity and conformist
social learning. Following their lead, this article uses a
group selection approach to explore the coevolution of
behavioral strategies and learning rules in the context of a
bcooperative dilemma.Q By cooperative dilemma we mean a
situation in which an individual must choose whether or not
to behave cooperatively, and benefit the group, or unco-
operatively, and benefit himself. In our model, there are two
social learning rules, conformism and payoff-dependent
imitation, which evolve by natural selection, and three
behavioral strategies, cooperate, defect, and cooperate, plus
punish defectors, which evolve under the influence of the
prevailing learning rules.
To the extent that our analysis is concerned with
competing learning rules, it relates to the literature on
endogenous learning. There is, however, one important
difference. This literature is primarily concerned with social
and individual learning as alternative ways to acquire
information about the natural environment. Within such a
framework, Boyd and Richerson (1985) demonstrate how
the balance between social and individual learning depends
on the accuracy of learning and the variability of the
environment. Feldman, Aoki, and Kumm (1996) show that
social learning can evolve if there is a fixed fitness cost to
learning errors, while Henrich and Boyd (1998) show that
social learning can evolve as long as the environment is not
too variable.
The aims of this article are as follows: firstly, to
determine if conformist transmission can evolve within the
context of a cooperative dilemma, and secondly, to explore
the impact of conformism on cooperation. Henrich and
Boyd (2001) and Henrich (2004) observe that conformism
to norms that are costly to the individual is most likely to
evolve in tandem with individually beneficial conformism.
Individuals may find it very difficult to distinguish between
actions that are eventually costly to them and those that are
eventually beneficial. Under these conditions, it may be best
to conform blindly to the prevailing norm, even though this
may sometimes involve taking actions that harm oneself.
The alternative of doing it alone or seeking to be more
selective may be worse. Henrich and Boyd (2001) and
Henrich (2004) also observe, without elaboration, that
costly conformism might evolve on its own through natural
selection. In this article, we show the second observation is
correct. We also show that the presence of conformists
dramatically increases the group size for which cooperation
can be sustained.
2. Model
We shall now develop a model in which evolution
determines both the learning rules that individuals adopt and
the behavioral strategies which they follow. The learning
rules evolve at the biological level and the strategies chosen
by individuals at any time are based on these rules. Our
model builds on the work of Boyd et al. (2003), but departs
from it by allowing conformist learning, and by making
learning rules endogenous.
There are G groups, each of which has N members.
Following Boyd et al. (2003) we assume that the size of
each group is kept constant through local density-dependent
competition. Every year the members of a particular group
play a societal game. This game is divided into five phases:
hunting, war, learning, reproduction, and migration.
During the hunting phase, each individual follows one of
three possible behavioral strategies: cooperate (C), defect
(D), and cooperate and punish defectors (P). Denote by
r(s)a[0,1], the fraction of the group that chooses strategy
sa{C,D,P}. Someone who intends to cooperate may
erroneously defect with probability e, so the ex post fraction
of defectors will be r(D)+e[r(C)+r(P)]. We assume that
punishers who unintentionally fail to cooperate continue to
punish. Let p(s,r) be the payoff of an individual who
follows strategy s when the distribution of types in his group
is r(d ). We define p(s,r) as follows:
p D; rð Þ ¼  pr Pð Þ þ z;
p C; rð Þ ¼  1 eð Þc epr Pð Þ þ z;
p P; rð Þ ¼  1 eð Þc epr Pð Þ  k r Dð Þ þ e r Cð Þ½f
þ r Pð Þg þ z;
where z=max[(1e)c+k,p]. The positive constants c, k, and
p capture the costs of cooperating, punishing, and being
punished, respectively. We assume that (1e)( pc)Nke, so
that defection does not pay if every member of the group is
a punisher. The inclusion of z in the payoff function
guarantees that payoffs are always positive. This condition
is required to ensure that the imitation rule given below is
meaningful.
Note that there is no need to specify the immediate
benefits of cooperation in the above equations since these
are enjoyed by all members of the group equally and
therefore do not affect relative fitness within the group.
Moreover, these immediate benefits are cancelled out by the
environmental pressures that keep the size of the group
constant. The only role that cooperation plays in our model
is in intergroup conflict through its influence on the
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probability of victory. This is also the case in Boyd et al.
(2003).
In each period, all groups pair at random. Every pair of
groups makes war with probability e. Only one group in
each warring pair survives. Suppose Groups g and gV enter
into conflict. Group g will survive with probability
1/2[1+rV(D)r(D)], where r(D) is the fraction of defectors
in group gV and rV(D) is the fraction of defectors in group gV.
The surviving group fissions and repopulates the site of the
extinct group in the following fashion. First, every
individual in the surviving group produces a clone of
himself. Second, individuals and their clones intermingle
and are randomly reassigned to the site of the surviving
group or to the site of the extinct one, creating two new
groups of size N. [For a discussion of fission as a
mechanism by which successful groups propagate them-
selves, see Richerson and Boyd (1998).]
Individuals come in two genetic types that differ
according to their learning rules: payoff-dependent imitators
and conformists.1 Every individual uses the same learning
rule throughout his life. The evolution of learning rules is
governed by natural selection.
Individuals die with probability q. A dead individual is
replaced by a son of some member of his group. The
probability that a dead individual will be replaced by a son




The newborn son will be an exact replica of his father.
Thus, he will have the same genetically determined learning
rule as his father, and will start life with his father’s
behavioral strategy. With probability v the son will
immediately mutate and adopt a random learning rule and
behavioral strategy.
During the learning phase, each payoff-dependent
imitator meets a role model from his group. Let s be the
behavioral strategy used by the imitator, and let sV be the
strategy used by the role model. The probability that
the imitator will adopt the behavioral strategy of the role
model is
p sV; rð Þ
p s; rð Þ þ p sV; rð Þ :
After meeting the role model, the imitator may still
decide to innovate and switch to a randomly chosen
behavioral strategy with probability l. Note that mutation
and innovation are distinct. Mutation occurs only at birth
and hence at most once, whereas innovation may occur
several times during a lifetime.
Conformists do not innovate and just play their group’s
modal strategy s*, where
s4 ¼ arg max r sð Þ
s C;D;Pf g
:
In order to introduce a migration-like force, we assume
that each individual meets a stranger from another group
with probability m. Let p be the last payoff of the
individual, and let pV be the last payoff of the stranger.
Following Boyd et al. (2003), we assume that the individual




The above process can be justified as follows. Since each
group is of constant size, an immigrant must compete with
some local individual for a place in the group. It is
reasonable to assume that the probability of victory in this
contest will be determined by their relative payoffs.
Finally, we assume that at the beginning of time there are
G1 groups of payoff-dependent imitators who all use the
behavioral strategy defect and one group of conformists that
all use the strategy cooperate and punish.
3. Results
3.1. Baseline scenario
Following Boyd et al. (2003), we simulate the model of
the previous section for conditions that approximate those in
which early hominids lived. Each simulation spans 2000
years of model time. Baseline parameters are given in
Table 1. Most of these parameters are taken from Boyd et al.
(2003) and we do not justify them here. Our model
introduces two new parameters: the death rate and the
mutation rate. We set the death rate at q=0.1, which implies
a reproductive life of 10 years. The mutation rate is assumed
to be one order of magnitude lower than the innovation rate.
1 Although inspired by Henrich and Boyd (2001), we model
conformism somewhat differently. They assume that all individuals engage
in some combination of payoff-based transmission and conformist
transmission. In contrast, we assume that individuals come in two extreme
types, some of whom learn entirely through payoff-dependent imitation and
the rest through conformist transmission. Our assumption both simplifies
the simulation analysis and makes it easier to compare our numerical results
to those of Boyd et al. (2003).
Table 1
Parameters of the baseline model
Parameter Value
Number of groups G 128
Group size N 64
Cost of cooperation c 0.2
Cost of punishing k 0.2
Cost of being punished p 0.8
Probability of erroneous defection e 0.02
Migration rate m 0.01
Innovation rate (behavioral strategies) l 0.01
Conflict rate e 0.015
Death rate q 0.1
Mutation rate (learning rules) v 0.001
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Fig. 1 presents the simulation results for our model using
the baseline parameters (the solid square lines), along with
simulation results for three other models. These other
models make different assumptions about the availability
of learning and behavioral strategies: one model contains
punishment but rules out conformism (the empty square
lines); one contains conformism but rules out punishment
(the empty triangle lines); and in one, both punishment and
conformism are ruled out (the empty circle lines). The
model with punishment but not conformism corresponds to
the model in Boyd et al. (2003). The figure plots averages of
frequencies over the final 1000 years of 20 simulations.
To understand these results, it is convenient to analyze
first the dynamics of the societal game for a group that lives
in isolation, subject to no mutation, no migration, and no
war, and is comprised entirely of payoff-dependent imitators.
In such a group, there are no conformists. Under these
conditions, the societal game will have two kinds of
equilibrium: one composed entirely of defectors and one
with no defectors at all. In the latter type of equilibrium the
condition r(P)Na must be satisfied, where a=c/p is the
fraction of punishers such that cooperation and defection
yield the same payoff. If this condition is not satisfied, then
defectors can invade and eventually take over. Consider an
equilibrium in which the fraction of punishers is equal to
r0(P)Na. If someone innovates and becomes a defector he
will be driven out by punishers. However, this will require a
finite period of time during which punishers will incur the
extra cost of policing defectors and hence will be less fit than
cooperators. During the transition period to the new
equilibrium, the ratio of punishers to cooperators will
therefore decrease. When the population restabilizes after
the innovator has been driven out, this will be in a new
equilibrium with r1(P)br0(P). Eventually, as a result of
successive innovations 1, 2,. . ., j, there will come a point
where rj(P)ba, and from then onward defectors will prosper
and take over. In consequence, the only stable equilibrium of
the societal game is the one in which everybody defects.
Now consider the case with migration and war between
groups. As before, assume there is no mutation and that all
individuals are payoff-dependent imitators, but this time
suppose that no peer-to-peer sanctioning is available. In this
scenario there are no conformists and no punishers, and the
only strategies available are cooperation and defection. The
long-run values of cooperation in this scenario are depicted
by the circle line in Fig. 1A. In small groups, moderate
levels of cooperation are achieved by group selection alone.
When two groups enter into conflict, the one with more
cooperators is more likely to win and repopulate the site of
the other. In this way cooperation will spread between
groups. For group selection to produce high levels of
cooperation, however, intergroup variation is needed. If it is
absent, group selection will have nothing to select from
when groups go to war. The extent of intergroup variation
depends on the balance between the homogenizing effect of
migration and the diversity arising from innovation and
fissioning within groups. When group size is small,
innovation and fissioning can generate enough intergroup
diversity to offset the homogenizing effect of migration. In
larger groups, however, the law of large numbers comes into
play so that innovation and fissioning produce less
variation, with the result that diversity arising from this
source is no longer sufficient to offset migration and
preserve the intergroup variation required to sustain
cooperation.
As can be observed from the empty square line in Fig. 1A,
the addition of punishers ameliorates the negative effect of
large group size. With a high proportion of punishers the
first-order free-riding problem—the irruption of defectors—
is solved. Although a second-order free-riding problem
emerges—cooperators failing to punish defectors—this
problem is less serious: whereas the payoff advantage of
defectors over cooperators does not depend on the frequency
of defection, the payoff advantage of cooperators over
punishers decreases as defectors become rare. As Boyd
et al. (2003) point out, this helps to explain why group
selection may favor the evolution of substantial levels of
punishment and maintain punishment once it is common.
Even when peer-to-peer sanctioning is available, random
variation is still needed to sustain high levels of cooperation.
Fig. 1. Cooperation (A) and conformism (B) in alternative models.
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To see why, suppose that all groups are in a cooperative
equilibrium without defectors, and let r0(P)Na be the
fraction of punishers in the overall population. Also suppose
the homogenizing effect of migration has operated long
enough so that the share of punishers is the same in all groups.
If groups are large, the law of large numbers entails that the
same fraction of every group will innovate and start
defecting. Punishers will drive them out, but during the
transition period the share of punishers in all groups will
decrease to r1(P)br0(P). Since this process will generate no
intergroup variation, when war happens, group selection will
have nothing to select. As in the isolated group case, the share
of punishers will eventually fall to the point where innovating
defectors can successively invade and cooperation will break
down. Even if groups are too small for the law of large
numbers to operate effectively, migration may still reduce
intergroup differences, thereby undermining cooperation.
The triangle lines in Fig. 1 show that conformism and
cooperation coevolve in our model even when no peer-to-
peer sanctioning is available. The mere presence of
conformists raises the frequency of cooperation in compar-
ison to the no conformism and no punishment scenario, and
makes cooperative behavior possible in much larger groups.
To see why, imagine a group of cooperative conformists,
which is colonized by a foreign defector. Since cooperation
will still be the modal behavior of the group, conformists will
not react to the payoff advantage of the newcomer; they will
just keep on cooperating. In this example, conformism acts
as a shield against the homogenization across groups,
reinforcing the effect of innovation and fissioning.
The solid square lines in Fig. 1 show what happens in our
baseline model, which contains both conformism and
punishment. In this model, cooperation achieves a very
high level and is an increasing function of group size. The
combination of conformism and punishment encourages
cooperation in several ways. Consider a group in which
punishment is the modal strategy. Over the course of time,
such a group will absorb a stream of bnewcomersQ in the
form of immigrants and newborns, together with existing
members who modify their strategies by innovating. If the
newcomer is a conformist, he will adopt the modal strategy
and become a punisher who reinforces group cooperation.
However, if he is a payoff-dependent imitator, then,
according to his previous experience, he may adopt another
course of action. He may defect, in which case he will
directly weaken the group, or else he may simply cooperate,
but fail to punish defectors, thereby encouraging defection
by others. In a group where punishment is the modal
strategy, conformist newcomers will immediately start to
punish, whereas payoff-dependent imitators may choose
some other form of behavior. In such a group, conformism
stabilizes punishment and reinforces cooperation.
Conformism also has another positive effect on cooper-
ation. Consider a conformist-defector who migrates into a
population consisting mainly of punishers. On arriving in
his new group he will immediately switch to the modal
behavior, so that punishers will have no reason to punish
him. This benefits both the group and the newcomer, who
avoids being punished. That conforming is convenient for
immigrants is no new discovery. On the contrary, it was long
ago captured by conventional wisdom: when in Rome, do as
the Romans do.
In sum, conformism preserves between-group variation
and stabilizes punishment; punishment protects groups from
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Fig. 3. How conflict and migration affect cooperation (A) and conformism (B).
R. Andre´s Guzma´n et al. / Evolution and Human Behavior 28 (2007) 112–117116
the spread of defection and may also give conformists a
fitness advantage over payoff-dependent imitators. For these
reasons, punishment, conformism, and cooperation co-
evolve in our model, and cooperation is high even in large
groups. Our findings confirm the observation of Henrich
and Boyd (2001) that bconformist transmission, operating
directly on cooperative strategies, is unlikely to maintain
cooperation in the absence of punishment.Q
Perhaps the most puzzling of our findings is the fact
that cooperation increases with group size, instead of
decreasing, as one might expect. Fig. 2 shows the
frequencies of the three strategies in the baseline model,
for different group sizes. As groups become larger, so does
the share of punishers, until almost everyone is a punisher.
This may be for the following reason. When groups are
small, innovation and fissioning are likely to move groups
out of the equilibrium favored by group selection: the one
where everybody punishes. In addition to its impact on the
number of punishers, such bnoiseQ may also turn conform-
ism into a drawback, since out of equilibrium the modal
strategy of the group need not coincide with the strategy
that is optimal for the group as a whole. In large groups,
the law of large numbers dissipates the effects of random
variation, and the mix of punishment and conformism
displays its full potential.
3.2. Sensitivity analysis
Fig. 2 shows how our model responds to a low conflict
rate (l=0.0075) and to a high migration rate (m=0.05). As
can be observed, the combination of conformism and
altruistic punishment is able to sustain high levels of
cooperation for all group sizes under these very adverse
conditions. Note that cooperation falls slightly at interme-
diate group sizes. This can be explained as follows. When
groups are small, random variation keeps cooperation high,
even though the variation weakens the combined effect of
conformism and altruistic punishment. At intermediate
group sizes, the law of large numbers dilutes random
variation enough to dampen group selection, but not enough
for conformism and altruistic punishment to fully counter
the homogenizing force of migration. Finally, when groups
are large, random variation vanishes completely, conform-
ism and punishment thrive, and so does cooperation (Fig. 3).
We also considered the effect of allowing conformist to
innovate, and of assuming that innovation and mutation
rates are the same. None of these modifications significantly
affected the results of our model.
4. Conclusion
We have shown that conformism can evolve when the
only problem that individuals face is a cooperative dilemma.
There is no need to assume that costly conformism is a spin-
off from individually beneficial conformism. We have also
shown that conformism and altruistic punishment coevolve,
allowing groups of greater size to sustain cooperation. This
occurs because conformism preserves between-group vari-
ation and stabilizes punishment, and because punishment
protects groups from the spread of defection and gives
conformists a fitness advantage over payoff-dependent
imitators.
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